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Summary
This paper analyzes changes in the Croatian party system in the 1990-2016 
period by looking at trends in the ideological makeup of voters of the main 
center-right (HDZ) and center-left (SDP) parties. An assessment of changes in 
voter self-placement on a left-right scale has shown a gradual increase in the 
ideological distance among voters of these parties. Further, the paper detected 
a trend towards an increase in the share of self-declared far-right voters among 
HDZ voters and far-left voters among SDP voters. In addition, an analysis of 
categorical ideological identification has demonstrated that, on average, two 
thirds of HDZ voters were Christian Democrats, while two thirds of SDP vot-
ers were Social Democrats. However, among all Christian Democrats, an ave-
rage of 55 percent voted for the HDZ, while just shy of 60 percent of Social 
Democrats voted for the SDP. Finally, a logistic regression analysis has con-
firmed the importance of the cultural dimension of voter behavior in Croatia. 
Religiosity levels, as well as left-right self-placement serve as rather good 
predictors of a vote for the HDZ and the SDP, with the model showing greater 
explanatory strength for HDZ voters. In conclusion, the observed trends in 
ideological characteristics of HDZ and SDP voters could serve as pointers 
of underlying shifts in patterns of party competition and offer clues to the in-
creased instability of the Croatian party system following the 2015 and 2016 
parliamentary elections.
Keywords: Left-Right Self-Placement, Voter Behavior, Voter Ideology, Parti-
sanship, Croatia
Introduction
Both electoral studies and party competition and party system studies can place their 
emphasis either on the supply side (provided by political competitors through poli-
cy content and electoral manifestos) or on the demand side (stemming from public 
emphasis, media coverage, and voter interests, values, and policy preferences). This 
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8paper takes the latter approach in its attempt to shed some light on the ideologi-
cal underpinnings of voters of the two main Croatian political parties – the center-
right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), a member of the European People’s Party 
(EPP), and the center-left Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), a member of 
the Party of European Socialists (PES). A party system analysis focusing on only 
two parties, rather than looking at the structural features of the whole party sys-
tem might seem odd, yet, in the Croatian case, these two parties have demonstrated 
great resilience and permanency, despite several changes of both the electoral and 
the party system, during the last 27 years. Indeed, until the turbulent 2015 and 2016 
parliamentary elections, both the Croatian party system and its two main parties 
have shown a high degree of stability, showcased in nationwide party organiza-
tions reaching to almost every township, strong party identification, and high party 
membership numbers (Nikić Čakar and Čular, 2016: 109). Besides the second-short-
est (147 days in office) government headed by non-partisan Tihomir Orešković, all 
other prime ministers since the transition election in 1990 have been either from the 
HDZ or the SDP. Since the change from a mixed-member parallel to a party-list pro-
portional representation electoral system in 1999, and the subsequent transformation 
of the party system towards moderate pluralism (see Čular, 2001: 130), the average 
joint share of parliamentary seats of the HDZ and the SDP has been around two 
thirds (see Raos, 2015a: 9), highlighting their leading role in the Croatian party sys-
tem. Thus, this article tries to sketch out ideological profiles of HDZ and SDP voters 
in the last quarter century, in order to offer additional knowledge that might enable a 
better understanding of the direction of party system change in Croatia. Hereby, the 
key element for the determination of ideological profiles of voters shall be their self-
placement on the left-right scale. In a second step, regression models will try to test 
whether ideological indicators can predict voter choice for these parties. 
Left-Right Self-Placement and the Study of Voter Behavior 
and Party Competition
Ever since Inglehart and Klingemann’s ground-breaking 1976 study (2010), show-
ing that self-placement of voters on a 10-point left-right scale can consistently serve 
as a very good predictor of voter behavior and party identification, researchers have 
extensively used this measure to infer about patterns of party competition and voter 
support. Although some researchers doubt that the left-right scale can point to an 
actual ideological identity of voters, but rather gives insight to voter identification 
with a party or group (Čular, 1999: 165), in this analysis we are using the left-right 
self-placement of voters as somewhat of a proxy measure that will enable us to dis-
cern the relative ideological characteristics of voters of Croatia’s two main political 
parties. Studies assessing the left-right self-placement of voters often use the left-
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9right positioning as a clue to voter policy preferences, yet a voter’s left-right place-
ment does not automatically translate into a corresponding policy choice offered 
by a given political party (Todosijević, 2004: 413-414). Furthermore, researchers 
have spilled much ink about the inquiry whether left-right self-placement is more 
strongly related to party choice (as well as an indicator of partisanship, i.e. affective 
attachment to a political party) or to policy preferences and value orientations (cf. 
Knutsen, 1997). Later studies have (re)introduced a third factor – social identities, 
produced by class (socioeconomic identity) and belonging to an organized religion 
or a trade union (cf. Freire, 2006), that is strongly related to the left-right positioning 
of voters. However, a recent study has also demonstrated that voters often determine 
their self-placement on the left-right scale in accordance to their party preference 
and identification with a perceived ideological image of their preferred political par-
ty projects (cf. Medina, 2015: 787). Such findings are also supported by research 
which has shown that left-right placement has greater explanatory power in high-
lighting policy positions of parties than in pointing to policy preferences of voters 
(Lesschaeve, 2017). Thus, we might infer that it is easier to detect a voter’s attach-
ment to, say, the “left” and a party that embodies the notion of the political left, than 
to discern leftist policy preferences of the said voter. This in turn emphasizes the 
idea that voters are more often motivated by affective behavior and feelings of be-
longing to a political camp, than by genuine ideas about different policy alternatives. 
Although Western European, as opposed to Eastern European party systems, tend to 
follow a somewhat clearer pattern of what constitutes left and right in the left-right 
ideational scheme, where there is an overlap of economic and cultural right positions 
(free market economy and social conservatism), i.e. economic and cultural left po-
sitions (welfare state economy and social progressivism), scholars have shown that 
the driving forces behind left-right self-placement can be in flux even in established 
democracies and have to be analyzed contextually, pointing to the example of migra-
tion and integration as new cultural issues that have started reshaping voter identities 
across Western Europe (de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee, 2013: 235-236). There-
fore, it is worth investigating whether the Croatian case, which combines a Western 
party structure with strong organizational features and a high degree of stability, 
with the emphasis on religious, cultural, and historic issues that drive voter identi-
ties, as often found in post-communist countries, could be a suitable sandbox for 
the testing of voter values and ideological profiles as determinants of party choice. 
Ideology, Values, and Party Competition in Croatia
Research on the left-right placement of parties (based on the Comparative Manifesto 
Project methodology) and voter self-placement on the left-right scale has revealed 
that, contrary to Western Europe, in Croatia, party competition, voter behavior and 
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partisanship follow long-term attachments and structural features, disregarding po-
licy innovation, policy shift or ideological re-alignments of mainstream political 
parties (Čular and Nikić Čakar, 2012: 27-28). The same study has also shown that, 
although political parties to the left in Croatia do place a stronger emphasis on eco-
nomic issues in their manifestos than their right-of-the-center counterparts, voter 
left-right positioning is clearly determined by (cultural) values, and not economic 
interests or policy preferences.1 This analysis of voter ideology of two main politi-
cal parties in Croatia and the attempt to test predictors of the vote for the HDZ and 
the SDP should, thusly, also give preference to cultural, as opposed to economic ex-
planations. In addition, these previous findings by Čular and Nikić Čakar may also 
serve as a justification for this paper’s exclusive emphasis on the voter dimension, 
i.e. the demand side of party competition.
The choice of predictors pertaining to the cultural dimension builds upon a 
body of previous research about party competition in Croatia and the structure of 
the electorate. A study of 2003 polling data has shown that the ideological struc-
ture of Croatian voters and their left-right positioning can be primarily explained 
through their attachment to or distance from the Catholic Church, history, tradition, 
and the legacy of World War II and the Croatian War for Independence, while so-
cioeconomic factors play a secondary role (Henjak, 2005: 102). Such findings are 
supported by earlier studies that tried to determine the structural features of party 
competition in Croatia and detect the underlying cleavages (see Milas and Rimac, 
1994; Zakošek, 1994) or to determine specific political subcultures that shape vo-
ter behavior and are rooted in distinct cultures of memory (of World War II) (see 
Šiber, 1997). Later studies that have combined voter behavior study with elector-
al geography have once again highlighted the importance of the religious/secular 
cleavage for the understanding of long-term attachments of voters to Croatian par-
ties, especially the two largest ones – the HDZ and the SDP (cf. Grdešić, 2013). 
A repeated study using a pre-electoral survey for the 2007 parliamentary election 
confirmed the importance of the cultural dimension of party competition and vo-
ter behavior (i.e. values) over interests (socioeconomic policy orientations), even 
though the 2007 election saw both major parties structure their campaigns around 
key economic policy issues (e.g. tax code reform) (cf. Henjak, 2007). Finally, a 
study on asymmetric voter mobilization, whereby the main center-right party HDZ 
has maintained a much stronger voter cohesion and stronger attachment of its core 
electorate than centrist and center-left parties, has both confirmed the primacy of 
cultural and symbolic issues as determinants of voter behavior in Croatia, as well 
1 However, some authors have challenged an overemphasis of the cultural dimension of party 
competition and voter behavior and tried to revisit economic (i.e. class-based) voting patterns in 
Croatia (see Dolenec, 2012). 
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as highlighted the specificity of HDZ voters as opposed to the general electorate 
(cf. Henjak, 2011).
Building upon previous studies, which had established that voter choice and 
party identity in Croatia are more closely linked to values than interests, we shall 
structure our analysis of ideological profiles of HDZ and SDP voters around the fol-
lowing research questions:
1. What kind of distinct trends can we observe in the change of left-right posi-
tioning of HDZ and SDP voters, their relative distance from each other and 
from the average voter?
2. What kind of distinct trends can we observe in the share of far-right voters 
among HDZ voters and far-left voters among SDP voters?
3. Have the HDZ and the SDP succeeded in becoming parties representing 
voters that primarily identify with the proclaimed ideologies of these par-
ties (Christian Democracy and Social Democracy, respectively)?
4. How well can we establish the likelihood of a vote for the HDZ and the SDP 
using predictors pertaining to the cultural dimension of party competition, 
including voter self-placement on the left-right index?
Data and Methods
The dataset used in this paper is derived from the Croatian Electoral Studies2 collec-
tion of pre-electoral and post-electoral surveys. The timeframe ranges from the first 
parliamentary election in 1990 to the most recent, 2016 election for the Croatian 
Parliament. This valuable dataset was produced as part of long-term projects con-
ducted at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb, which makes it comparable to 
similar national electoral studies in other European countries. However, due to vari-
ous sources and models of funding the execution of the polling, there is a degree of 
internal inconsistency that had to be dealt with during the data management phase 
of this analysis. In other words, although all nine surveys included in this dataset 
share most of the same questions, the questionnaires did vary over time, so that 
2 Croatian Electoral Studies encompass datasets derived from pre-electoral (1990, 1992, 1995, 
2000, 2003, 2007) and post-electoral (2011, 2015, 2016 parliamentary elections, survey conduc-
ted in 2012, 2016, and 2017 respectively) surveys conducted by the Faculty of Political Sciences, 
University of Zagreb. The former surveys were financed through two long-term projects funded 
by the Croatian Ministry of Science and Education – Elections, Parties, and Parliament in Croa-
tia: 1990-2000 (project leader: Ivan Grdešić) and Elections, Parties, and Parliament in Croa-
tia: 2000-2010 (project leader: Mirjana Kasapović), while the latter polls were financed through 
projects funded by the University of Zagreb (project leader: Nenad Zakošek), as well as through 
a European Social Fund-supported project Advancing the Quality of Higher Education through 
the Implementation of the Croatian Qualification Framework (project leader: Andrija Henjak).
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some questions asked in earlier polls were omitted in later ones or the same question 
asked over numerous polls does not contain the same number of possible answers. 
Therefore, to prepare the data for analysis, we had to recode and rescale some of 
the variables, a process we shall briefly describe here. In addition, there is another 
disclaimer to be made concerning the datasets used in this analysis. Namely, these 
polls were not all conducted by the same polling agency, which in practice means 
that the stratified sampling methodology used for selection of survey participants 
is not the same for all nine surveys. The Croatian polling industry includes several 
major polling agencies that roughly use the same methodology for this kind of sur-
vey, yet one should bear in mind that slight differences might exist. It is important 
to mention this as to understand that some of the figures derived in our analysis, e.g. 
average scores for the whole dataset might suffer from possible underlying discre-
pancies in the polling process. However, we are confident that this contextual fact 
will not affect the overall reliability of the analysis presented in this paper. 
Because one and the same question that appeared on questionnaires across the 
timeframe encompassed by the dataset could take two, three, or four values (an-
swers presented to respondents), we had to standardize them on a 0 to 1 scale. Be-
sides recoding, for one of the surveys, we had to employ some rescaling. Namely, 
in all but one of the nine surveys included in this dataset, the one pertaining to the 
2011 parliamentary election, the left-right index was measured using a 10-point 
scale. Thus, the 11-point Likert scale employed for the 2011 survey had to be trans-
formed into a 10-point scale.3 While Inglehart and Klingemann (2010: 247) have 
argued that the inclusion of a mid-point would be suggestive and induce undecided 
and conformist survey respondents to hide behind a neutral position, some studies 
(cf. Kroh, 2007: 212) claim that an 11-point scale offers better quality in captur-
ing all the subtleties of voter left-right self-placement. A cross-country study of the 
relative merits of using a 10-point versus an 11-point scale for the measurement 
of left-right voter positions has ended with inconclusive results, showing that the 
inclusion or omission of a true mid-point does not significantly affect the number 
of non-responses in a survey, but is rather a reflection of country-specific research 
traditions (Zuell and Scholz, 2016: 13). In the Croatian case, the tradition seems to 
lean towards a 10-point scale, while the 2011 survey data represent an exception.
The analysis conducted in this paper is divided in two parts. In the first part, 
we assess the change in the mean scores on the 10-point left-right scales for HDZ 
and SDP voters for nine electoral cycles, from 1990 to 2016 and contrast these 
values with the mean scores for the entire electorate (i.e. all respondents in each 
survey). We can interpret the scores obtained through voter self-placement on the 
3 See IBM, 2016 for a guide on transformation of measurement scales that have an odd versus 
an even number of points.
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left-right scale as corresponding to distinct political positions. Thus, we can view 
“the values 1-2 on the scale as an expression of an extreme left location, 3-4 as an 
expression of a moderate left location, 5 a center-left location, 6 a center-right loca-
tion, 7-8 a moderate right location, and 9-10 an extreme right location” (Knutsen, 
1998: 293). Therefore, after analyzing the change in mean values for both parties, 
we look specifically at the shares of those HDZ and SDP voters that placed them-
selves on the far-right or the far-left side of the spectrum. Further, we look at data 
showing ideological self-placement of the HDZ and the SDP regarding descrip-
tive ideological categories, offered by the survey questionnaires – Christian Demo-
cracy, Communism, Conservatism, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Social Democra-
cy. In addition, we look at the share of HDZ voters and SDP voters among voters 
self-identifying as Christian Democrats and Social Democrats respectively. Un-
fortunately, for this categorical variable, we only have data from 2000 to 2016, as 
this question was not included in surveys in 1990, 1992, and 1995. In the second 
part, we test a regression model in our attempt to understand voter choice of HDZ 
and SDP.
To test the likelihood of votes for the HDZ and the SDP, we used a logistic 
regression model centered around several predictors that pertain to the cultural di-
mension of party competition in Croatia. Since the pre-electoral and post-electoral 
polls conducted as part of Croatian Electoral Studies in the 1990-2017 period vary 
in the makeup of their questionnaires, only a handful of variables that appear in all 
polls encompassed in the dataset could be used for this model. Although it would 
be certainly interesting to use predictors such as main social values (e.g. equality, 
freedom, security, etc.) and the respondents’ connection with categories of notions 
of language, tradition, nation, and culture, the only variables relevant for the cul-
tural dimension of party competition that appear in all nine polls in this dataset are 
religiosity (attachment and commitment to doctrine and practice of a denomina-
tion) and the stance on abortion, as a measure of a key bioethical cleavage running 
through the electorate.4 In addition, the left-right self-placement scale (RILE index) 
was added as a third predictor. Thus, in a trade-off between a more comprehensive 
set of predictors and a more inclusive timeframe, this analysis opted for a longer 
timeframe. Nevertheless, when evaluating the results of the regression analysis, 
one should certainly bear in mind that the inclusion of more indicators, albeit with 
a smaller (temporally shorter) dataset would not necessarily have yielded different 
results but would have provided models with a better fit. 
As mentioned before, the categorical predictors had to be recoded, to standard-
ize them across all nine polls. The religiosity variable was recoded to Convinced 
4 Voter opinion on the legality and availability of abortion was already used in earlier studies as 
an indicator of religious/secular or conservative/liberal values. See, for example, Bagić, 2007. 
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Believer (1), Traditional Believer (0.5) and Non-Religious (0), while the abortion 
variable was recoded to Abortion Ban (1) and Abortion Choice (0). The reference 
values (1) reflect the fact that the model was first run as a test for the outcome of 
voting for the HDZ, with the assumption that HDZ voters were more likely than 
SDP voters to have this value (1) on both predictors. 
For those survey years where the HDZ and the SDP formed pre-electoral coali-
tions with junior partners from the center-right and the center-left respectively, the 
data about the specific vote for each of these parties was obtained from a question 
in the survey questionnaire that asked respondents to say who they would vote for if 
the parties ran individually. However, for the last two elections, in 2015 and 2016, 
the survey questionnaires did not include this additional question. Yet, given the 
fact that HDZ and SDP voters far outnumber all their pre-electoral partners, one can 
safely assume that the fact that for these last two surveys the data for the HDZ and 
the SDP vote, the mean scores for left-right placement and the shares of descriptive 
ideological categories were obtained from respondents that chose the HDZ-led and 
SDP-led coalition, and not individual parties, should not have a major impact that 
would skew the results of our analysis. 
For the logistic regression models, we report two pseudo R2 measures, the Cox 
and Snell r-squared and its corrected version,5 the Nagelkerke r-squared, as pro-
duced by default in the SPSS output. Pseudo r-squared indices cannot be interpret-
ed in the same way as true r-squared measures in linear regression, i.e. we cannot 
infer a percentage of variance explained. However, they can serve as indicators of 
goodness-of-fit and as an approximation of the likelihood of events occurring (bi-
nary outcome on the dependent variable) given the predictors used in the model (cf. 
Smith and McKenna, 2013: 17). The significance of the models is assessed by re-
porting Pearson’s chi-square test, while the effect sizes of individual predictors are 
evaluated based on their odds ratios, i.e. the amount by which a rise on a predictor 
increases the log odds of an outcome on the dependent variable (cf. Kirkpatrick and 
Kidd, 2012: 103). 
Results and Discussion
In our assessment of the mean scores on the left-right scale for HDZ and SDP vo-
ters, we use both a tabular and a graphical approach, as an attempt to capture spe-
cific trends over time. The mean scores for HDZ voters, shown in Table 1, let us 
observe a gradual, yet steady rightward trend of this party’s electorate. While the 
5 The Nagelkerke r-squared measure takes the original Cox and Snell r-squared measure and 
transforms it so that it can encompass the full 0-1 range, as the actual r-squared measure does in 
linear regression.
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mean left-right score for HDZ voters at the first democratic election after the end of 
one-party rule placed it at the center-right (6.66), at the beginning of the new cen-
tury its constituents were to be found at the moderate right, with scores surpassing 
the 7.5 mark. The average left-right score for HDZ voters was over 7. SDP voters 
consistently achieved scores revolving around 3 to 3.5, placing this electoral group 
in the moderate left camp (see Table 1). The difference between the mean scores 
of HDZ and SDP voters has been on the increase since 2000 and has become es-
pecially pronounced in recent years (over 4 points). We can interpret the standard 
deviations of the mean left-right scores of HDZ and SDP voters as a measure of 
the relative ideological spread of voters both parties attract. Namely, a higher stan-
dard deviation would imply more variance in left-right scores for the party and thus 
a more heterogeneous electoral basis. On the contrary, a smaller standard devia-
tion could be interpreted as a sign of a clearer ideological profile of the party, as it 
manages to attract voters that are ideologically more homogeneous. Both parties 
started in 1990 with a standard deviation that would imply a more heterogeneous 
voter clientele (which should not come as a surprise, given that stable partisanship 
could not form before the first democratic election). Over time, both HDZ and SDP 
voters have become slightly more homogenous in ideological terms, judging from 
decreased standard deviations for the mean left-right scores, presented in Table 1. A 
comparison of averages of standard deviations for both parties shows a somewhat 
narrower ideological spread for SDP voters. 
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Table 1. Left-Right Self-Placement of HDZ and SDP Voters, 1990-2016
HDZ Voters SDP Voters M Diff. HDZ/SDP All Voters
M SD M SD M
1990 6.66 2.36 3.25 2.02 3.41 5.12
1992 6.27 1.75 3.57 1.47 2.70 5.82
1995 6.48 1.66 3.80 1.30 2.68 5.70
2000 6.79 2.13 3.92 1.55 2.87 5.13
2003 7.61 1.85 3.91 1.89 3.70 5.63
2007 7.68 1.88 3.81 1.62 3.87 5.46
2011 7.76 1.97 3.64 1.93 4.12 4.41
2015 7.75 2.06 3.39 1.62 4.36 5.47
2016 7.78 1.86 3.57 1.86 4.21 5.45
Average 7.19 1.95 3.65 1.70 3.55 5.35
M – mean, SD – standard deviation, M Diff. – difference between means for HDZ and SDP voters.
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When we look at the average left-right positions of HDZ voters, we can see that 
they were at the moderate right (7.19), while SDP voters were at the moderate left 
(3.65). The average ideological spread was somewhat lower for SDP voters (1.70 
as opposed to 1.95). Over time, SDP voters have shifted to the center in early 2000s 
and then back to the left in recent years, while for HDZ voters, we can talk about a 
center-right phase in the 1990s and a moderate right phase after 2000, which is at 
odds with the fact that the party has shifted to the center after 2000. If we compare 
the mean scores of HDZ and SDP voters with the mean scores for the whole elec-
torate, we can see that, on average, SDP voters were somewhat closer to the elec-
torate mean than HDZ voters (-1.70 difference versus 1.84 difference). In addition, 
we can see that the whole electorate was mildly tilted towards the center-left (a true 
center position would be a 5.5 score) in 1990 and again in the period after 2003, and 
more strongly shifted to the left (4.41) in 2011, when the center-left coalition won 
the election. Such results for the whole electorate might come as a surprise, given 
the fact that conventional wisdom in Croatia sometimes claims that Croatian voters 
were generally more titled to the right of the political spectrum, which would pro-
vide the main center-right party, the HDZ, with a distinctive advantage over its com-
petitors. Nevertheless, one should not forget the obvious limits and pitfalls of our 
usage of the RILE index as an indicator of ideological leanings of voters. Therefore, 
we should be cautious not to overemphasize the importance of some of the findings 
of this analysis. 
In Figure 1, we plotted the differences in mean left-right scores of HDZ and 
SDP voters against the mean for all voters (settled as 0). A visual inspection of the 
plot in this figure reveals that HDZ voters were closest to the total electorate mean 
in 1992 (+0.45 difference), at the time of the intra-conflict parliamentary election of 
19926 and during a period in which the HDZ held a dominant position in the party 
system (see also Kasapović, 1996; Zakošek, 2008). In 1995, at the end of the war, 
HDZ voters were also very close to the whole electorate, with a +0.78 difference. In 
the same year, the SDP was at its lowest point, in terms of electoral success. SDP vo-
ters came close to the electorate mean in 2000 (-1.21 difference), when a critical elec-
tion brought the first center-left coalition to power and changed the characteristics of 
the party system into moderate pluralism (see also Čular, 2001; Kasapović, 2003). 
The voters of this party were the closest to the electorate mean (-0.77 difference) in 
2011, when the SDP-led coalition decisively won the parliamentary election.
However, we can also detect a trend of a steady movement of HDZ voters fur-
ther away from the electorate mean, followed by a less drastic, yet also noticeable 
drift of SDP voters away from the average voter. In 2015, the voters of both par-
6 On the concept of intra-conflict elections and the Croatian case, see Picula, 2012.
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ties were the farthest apart from each other and the farthest from the total electorate 
mean. While Dalton’s polarization index (see Dalton, 2008) uses a measurement 
based on scores collected at the level of the party system, here we may employ an 
indirect assessment of party system polarization through the analysis of the rela-
tive distances of mean left-right scores of voters of two main parties from the mean 
scores of the whole electorate. In other words, we might infer that over time, HDZ 
and SDP voters have moved further to the right and left, respectively, positioning 
themselves farther from the electorate mean and the more centrist positions one 
would expect from voters of the two largest, mainstream parties. Coupled with the 
already discussed narrowing of the ideological spread among electorates of both 
parties, this could imply a general increase in the polarization of the Croatian party 
system, interpreted through the lens of the nature and position of voters of the two 
parties that drive the main forces of party competition in the country. Thus, we can 
answer the first research question by stating that voters of both parties have gradu-
ally moved away from the center and away from the electorate mean, while this 
movement has become more pronounced in recent years (2015 and 2016 parlia-
mentary elections).
Figure 1. Relative Left-Right Positions of HDZ and SDP Voters Compared 
with the Electorate Mean, 1990-2016
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Table 2. Far-Right and Far-Left Voters among HDZ and SDP Voters, 1990-2016
1990 1992 1995 2000 2003 2007 2011 2015 2016 Average
Far-Right (9-10) 
among HDZ Voters 21.1 7.9 10.3 21.6 31.0 34.4 32.3 37.9 36.2 25.9
Far-Left (1-2) 
among SDP Voters 37.4 20.8 14.6 13.8 20.1 18.1 28.5 28.5 27.3 23.2
Next, we shall discuss the change in the share of far-left and far-right voters, as 
presented in Table 2. The high proportions of voters in two main parties that self-
placed themselves at the edges of the left-right spectrum should not come as a sur-
prise in the early days of establishing a viable multiparty democracy, as survey re-
spondents might not fully understand the implications of the left-right index and are 
still struggling to clearly define personal ideological leanings. Indeed, subsequent 
polls have shown a reduction in the shares of such voters in the HDZ and the SDP 
electorate. However, since 2003, we can observe an increase among HDZ voters, 
with almost a third of this party’s voters consistently self-identifying on the far-right 
of the political spectrum. This is especially curious since this coincided with the 
rise to power of party president and prime minister (2003-2009) Ivo Sanader, a pro-
European leader who had gone to great lengths to move his party to the center. Yet, 
another interesting finding lies in the fact that in 2015 SDP voters also featured more 
than one third of voters who self-identified on the fringes of the political spectrum, 
albeit on the far-left, in this party’s case. Together with the data presented in Table 1 
and Figure 1, we can state that the year 2015 was the most polarized point in the de-
velopment of the Croatian party system, whereby the two major parties’ voters had 
the greatest ideological distance between each other, while the share of far-right and 
far-left voters among both parties’ electorates reached substantial levels. This was 
also the year in which the parliamentary election ended in an even result between the 
HDZ-led center-right and the SDP center-left blocks, leaving the newcomer centrist 
populist and anti-establishment reform party Most, a heterogenous coalition of inde-
pendent mayors and local lists, to play the kingmaker (cf. Grbeša and Šalaj, 2017). 
The finding that the share of far-right and far-left voters among HDZ and SDP 
voters is growing in recent years is rather interesting, given the fact that a study of 
voter polarization and partisanship has shown that parties well rooted in the soci-
ety (usually in established democracies) are able to thwart the rise of extremist par-
ties even in a situation of a polarized electorate (Ezrow, Tavits, and Homola, 2014: 
1575). This brings us back to the notion of the Croatian party system as an excep-
tion among party systems of Central and Eastern Europe, as it features strongly or-
ganized mainstream parties with wide membership that can maintain their electoral 
strength despite the underlying polarization among voters. However, the increase 
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in the proportion of far-right and far-left voters among voters of two parties around 
which the whole party system revolves might also indicate that the voters have no-
ticed an end to the pre-accession pro-EU supra-partisan consensus and have since 
2013 started to drift away to their true ideological leanings that are less mainstream 
than the leaders of their preferred parties would like them to be (cf. Raos, 2015b: 
172). The answer to the second research question is also confirmative and goes as 
follows: While the share of far-right voters among HDZ voters has been around one 
third ever since the 2003 parliamentary election, in recent years, especially in 2015, 
we could observe a significant rise in far-left voters among SDP voters as well, so 
that both major parties now attract large shares of voters that find their ideological 
home at the fringes of the left-right spectrum. We might infer that the experience 
of the 2008 economic crisis might have had an impact on the rise of far-left voters 
among SDP voters. In addition, the high proportion of far-right voters among HDZ 
voters at the two latest elections could be linked to the fact that for these years the 
polls show aggregate results for voters of the HDZ-led coalition that have included 
smaller parties that lie further to the right from the HDZ. 
The idea behind Table 3 (on the next page) and the data on the descriptive 
ideological self-placement of HDZ and SDP voters is the notion that a self-pro-
claimed Christian Democratic party,7 the HDZ, should be able to attract voters that 
self-identify as Christian Democrats, while the SDP, hence the name, would be ex-
pected to be the party that gathers Social Democrats.8 Findings which would meet 
such expectations would further confirm the clear ideological profile of these par-
ties, measured through the ideological profiles of their voters. As already noted, 
the descriptive ideological self-placement encompasses a reduced dataset, because 
data before 2000 is not available in the master dataset of Croatian Electoral Stu-
dies. In the observed period, HDZ voters were made up of, on average, roughly two 
thirds of self-identifying Christian Democrats, with smaller shares held by conser-
vative, nationalist, and liberal voters. Curiously, the analysis revealed that in 2000, 
the year of the critical election that for the first time sent the HDZ into opposition, 
slightly over 20 percent of HDZ voters identified as Social Democrats. There are 
no straightforward explanations for this finding and further research will be needed 
7 Article 1, paragraph 1 of its party statute defines the party platform of HDZ as rooted in “tra-
ditional, Christian democratic and universal humanist values (...)” (HDZ, 2018). However, in 
1989-1990, the party began as a broad national movement for self-determination of Croatia, with 
full independence as its final goal. European integration of Croatia and its active membership in 
the European People’s Party have provided HDZ with a more Christian democratic profile, yet it 
still remains a “broad church”, center-right to right-wing big-tent party that tends to emphasize 
its role as a “people’s, central, and state-building party” (HDZ, 2018). 
8 SDP lists its goals in article 10 of the party rulebook, while article 11 stipulates that these go-
als shall be achieved with “principal social democratic values” as a starting point (SDP, 2018).
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to offer plausible clarifications of such discrepancies and exceptions. In the case of 
SDP voters, an average of two thirds identified as Social Democrats, while slightly 
over 15 percent identified as Liberals. 
















HDZ 68.3 0.0 2.2 3.8 5.4 20.3 0.0 0.0
SDP 1.5 2.6 0.8 0.4 12.8 81.9 0.0 0.0
2003         
HDZ 64.8 0.0 5.0 13.1 8.5 7.0 1.6 0.0
SDP 8.8 1.9 2.5 0.6 20.8 65.4 0.0 0.0
2007        
HDZ 56.3 0.0 0.8 5.0 11.8 12.2 0.0 13.9
SDP 7.2 1.9 0.4 1.1 16.7 63.3 0.4 9.0
2011         
HDZ 72.9 0.0 3.9 1.9 7.7 8.4 0.6 4.6
SDP 17.3 1.0 1.6 0.3 11.9 62.8 0.0 5.1
2015  
HDZ 52.3 1.1 11.5 11.5 10.9 6.3 0.0 6.4
SDP 9.2 1.7 1.7 0.4 19.3 58.8 2.9 6.0
2016  
HDZ 69.6 2.1 9.4 4.7 4.2 7.9 0.0 2.1
SDP 10.4 2.2 0.0 2.2 15.3 63.4 0.0 6.5
Average
HDZ 64.0 0.5 5.5 6.7 8.1 10.4 0.4 4.5
SDP 9.1 1.9 1.2 0.8 16.1 65.9 0.6 4.4
In addition, we should note that the lowest share of Christian Democrats, with 
a parallel rise in the proportion of Conservatives and Nationalists could be ob-
served for the 2015 election, which the HDZ contested in a pre-electoral coalition 
with small parties to its right. In 2000, the SDP almost exclusively featured Social 
Democrats, yet over time, its share of self-identifying Liberals, but also Christian 
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Democrats has increased. The relatively prominent shares of Christian Democrats 
among SDP voters can hardly be explained by pointing out the fact that data for last 
two electoral cycles could not be disaggregated on individual party level, because 
the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), a member of the European People’s Party, only 
joined the SDP-led coalition in 2016, while already in 2011, we could detect an 
increase in Christian Democrats among voters of the Social Democratic Party. Of 
course, the increased number of Liberals could also be explained by arguing that 
this party’s elites have drifted further towards (economic) liberalism and do not ade-
quately represent and embody Social Democracy and thus cannot attract voters with 
social democratic leanings (see Dolenec, 2014). 
We can assess the ideological profile of the HDZ and the SDP through voter 
analysis not just by looking at whether there are high percentages of Christian De-
mocrats among HDZ voters and Social Democrats among SDP voters, but by ask-
ing ourselves how successful they were in capturing the overall Christian Demo-
cratic and Social Democratic vote. In Table 4, we can see that just over 55 percent 
of self-declared Christian Democrats voted for the HDZ in 2000, while the party 
was least successful in attracting this electorate in 2011, with only 40.5 of Chris-
tian Democrats choosing this party. On average, 55 percent of Christian Democrats 
voted for the HDZ. The SDP was somewhat more successful in capturing the Social 
Democratic vote over the years, yet with a low point in 2003 (the year they lost the 
election to the HDZ after being in government for the first time), with only 42.3 
percent of Social Democrats voting for the SDP. On average, a little less than 60 
percent of Social Democratic voters cast their ballots for the SDP. 
Table 4. Share of HDZ and SDP Voters among Christian Democratic and Social 
Democratic Voters, 2000-2016
2000 2003 2007 2011 2015 2016 Average
Christian Democratic voters 
that voted for HDZ (%) 55.7 49.6 67.3 40.5 56.3 60.4 55.0
Social Democratic voters 
that voted for SDP (%) 59.5 42.3 59.9 65.3 65.7 63.6 59.4
We can, therefore, state that the analysis has shown that both parties have de-
veloped an electoral basis that consists of a two-thirds majority of self-identifying 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats respectively, yet the SDP is somewhat 
more successful in capturing the Social Democratic vote than the HDZ in attract-
ing Christian Democratic voters. In addition, we can confirm that both parties have 
developed clear ideological profiles of their voters that match the official party 
ideologies. 
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The logistic regression models presented in Tables 5 and 6 showcase an at-
tempt to test the likelihood of a vote for HDZ and SDP by using predictors pertain-
ing to the cultural dimension of party competition. Three variables were used – the 
RILE index, as well as the religiosity and the abortion variables. In the models, 
we used the Convinced Believer category for the religiosity variable and the Abor-
tion Ban category for the abortion variable. As already mentioned in the Data and 
Methods section, we first tested the model on HDZ voters, with the assumption that 
there was a higher likelihood that these voters will score 1 on the religiosity vari-
able (Convinced Believer category) and 1 on the abortion variable (Abortion Ban 
category). 
Pearson’s chi-square test for the model across all nine surveys/points in time 
was highly statistically significant for both the HDZ and the SDP vote, which en-
ables us to safely reject the null-hypothesis. In addition, the relatively good fit of the 
model is showcased by relatively high r-squared values for almost all years, except 
for 1992 and 1995. As these years coincide with the Croatian War of Independence, 
that context might serve as an explanation for the difference in model fit, as other 
factors influenced voter choice in those years, not captured by the variables includ-
ed in the proposed logistic regression model. 
Of the three predictors used in the model, the RILE index proved to be highly 
statistically significant across all time points. This predictor has maintained simi-
lar effect sizes across time, while the importance of religiosity as a predictor has 
decreased over time. Put differently, being a Convinced Believer raised the odds of 
voting for the HDZ, i.e. decreased the odds of voting for the SDP, yet this effect has 
diminished over time. The third predictor, stance on abortion, was not statistically 
significant for some years, especially in the case of the SDP vote. The model also 
highlighted the differences between HDZ and SDP voters, with effect sizes much 
larger for HDZ voters. In other words, both the cultural predictors and the left-right 
index were better in estimating the likelihood of a vote for the Croatian Democratic 
Union than for the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. 
We can infer that cultural predictors indeed play a role in explaining the like-
lihood of the vote for the two main parties, yet key religious and bioethical indica-
tors are far better in predicting the odds of someone voting for the HDZ than for 
the SDP. Self-placement on the left-right index, as one of the predictors used in the 
model, serves well in explaining the likelihood of the vote for both the HDZ and the 
SDP. Such a finding is consistent with Čular’s and Nikić Čakar’s 2012 study that 
pointed out that, based on electoral manifesto analysis, one could conclude that cul-
tural categories were much more important for the right’s policy positions than for 
the left’s (see Čular and Nikić Čakar, 2012: 15-16).
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Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to explore the ideological profiles of voters of Croatia’s 
two largest parties, the HDZ and the SDP. We have looked at the mean left-right 
self-placement scores for voters of both parties and assessed their positions in re-
lation to the mean scores for the whole electorate. A trend of a drifting away from 
the electorate mainstream was observed for voters of both parties, with 2015 as the 
peak year. Together with the findings about the increase in voters who self-identify 
as far-right among HDZ voters and far-left among SDP voters, this could point to 
a general trend of increased polarization of the Croatian party system, as viewed 
from the perspective of voter demand. One possible explanation for this observed 
polarization could be found in the fact that the long and strenuous process of Croa-
tia’s EU accession was characterized by a cross-ideological multipartisan Alliance 
for Europe, an informal agreement of not contesting votes on adoption of the acquis 
communautaire in the Croatian Parliament. This has in turn somewhat frozen the 
underlying conflicts of the Croatian party system, which have then reemerged after 
the 2013 accession and started manifesting in voter behavior and self-identification 
(cf. Raos, 2015b: 168, 172). 
In addition, we have looked at descriptive ideological categories and voter self-
placement on the RILE index, as to determine whether the HDZ was successful at 
attracting Christian Democrats, while the SDP managed to attract Social Demo-
crats. The results show that the share of Christian Democrats among HDZ voters has 
been around two thirds for the observed period, with similar figures for the share of 
Social Democrats among SDP voters. Fifty-five percent of all self-declared Chris-
tian Democrats voted for the HDZ, while almost 60 percent of self-declared Social 
Democratic voters cast their ballots for the SDP. The logistic model that tested the 
likelihood of the vote for the HDZ and the SDP, using the RILE index, religiosity 
and stance on abortion as predictors, has confirmed the importance of cultural and 
ideological indicators in predicting voter choice. These indicators were better in ex-
plaining the likelihood of the vote for the HDZ than for the SDP. 
In future research, more complex models should be built, so that we might 
be able to provide more detail and predictive power. Nevertheless, the conducted 
analysis has confirmed the importance of cultural determinants and ideological 
positions for voter behavior in Croatia. Such findings were already established 
by previous studies, yet this paper offers a comprehensive approach, analyzing a 
large set across the entire timeframe of democratic party politics in the last quarter 
century, and assessing the issue with a combination of descriptive and inferential 
techniques. 
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